Sharon the Realist?
As Sharon's political career draws to an almost inevitable end, and the world's eyes shift to a possible successor, his style of politics is placed flatly on the agenda. What style of politics did he pursue? Henryk Broder, in an article published in the Spiegel, claims that he was a Realist. He begins a subheading entitled "Sharon the Realist" by explaining that
For Broder, the disengagement from Gaza (while moving more settlers into the West Bank) represented a fundamental turn in ideology. Sharon abandoned the Idealist vision of Greater Israel in favor of a strategy that would be the most beneficial and realistically attainable for Israel. It would be one of the rare moments in history when ethics and national self-interest labored hand in hand, without one delimiting the other. Ethically, of course, it was too little too late. Realistically as well. More importantly, the actual plan of separating the Palestinians of East Jerusalem with yet another artificial border that would curtail their freedom of movement, split families, obstruct their livelihood, and render some as "enemies" in Israel and others as Jerusalemites forced into "Palestine", cannot be the basis for a permanent solution. It exposes Sharon's willingness to settle for short-term solutions that appease his centrist coalition partners. That is not Realism, perhaps pragmatism.
This leads to Janine Zaccharia's appraisal (requires FP subscription) in Foreign Policy magazine, who claims that Sharon
Even critical International Herald Tribune columnist William Pfaff gives Sharon the doubtful benefit of Realism in TODAYonline:
Sharon was a realist and a pragmatist in the way he handled public opinion - and the way he bonded with Bush on ranches in the Negev and Texas. He kept his finger on the pulse of the Israeli mainstream and developed a sensibility to press in the right spots. But to me, the word opportunism springs to mind. No greater geopolitical corpus of principles or pattern of decision-making remains beyond this. In this vein, Olmert may well be able to carry on his legacy.
"This is why Sharon decided to do what he felt was the right thing to do: to follow the Gaza pullout with a withdrawal from large portions of the West Bank and then present the Palestinians with a fait accompli."While Realist conclusions can be reached based on the type of geopolitical sensibilities acquired through long participation in the arena of politics, merely acting on the impulse of what feels to be right ought to be described differently: decision-making based on intuitionist ethics. Of course, even Henry Kissinger, often upheld as the personification of Realism, could be charged with that type of conduct with regard to his alleged involvement in "Operation Condor" and his advice to indiscriminately bomb Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Perhaps it felt right for a man carved out of his timber to combat the communist threat without accounting for future ramifications. But if the costs outweighed the benefits, then his calculations were flawed, not misguided by an innate sense of justice. The same could, arguably, be said about Sharon's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which he hoped would fulfil the dual goals of expelling the PLO from the purview of international politics and establishing a friendly Maronite regime in Lebanon. With the benefit of hindsight, that was Realism gone awry. Permitting the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla could be reduced to bad impulses.
For Broder, the disengagement from Gaza (while moving more settlers into the West Bank) represented a fundamental turn in ideology. Sharon abandoned the Idealist vision of Greater Israel in favor of a strategy that would be the most beneficial and realistically attainable for Israel. It would be one of the rare moments in history when ethics and national self-interest labored hand in hand, without one delimiting the other. Ethically, of course, it was too little too late. Realistically as well. More importantly, the actual plan of separating the Palestinians of East Jerusalem with yet another artificial border that would curtail their freedom of movement, split families, obstruct their livelihood, and render some as "enemies" in Israel and others as Jerusalemites forced into "Palestine", cannot be the basis for a permanent solution. It exposes Sharon's willingness to settle for short-term solutions that appease his centrist coalition partners. That is not Realism, perhaps pragmatism.
This leads to Janine Zaccharia's appraisal (requires FP subscription) in Foreign Policy magazine, who claims that Sharon
"was courageous enough to abandon the Gaza Strip—and with it, his dream of a Greater Israel—in favor of pragmatism. It looks like he will not live to see Israel’s borders formally drawn and more settlements removed. But he may have already charted a course that his successor—whoever that may be—has no choice but to follow."J. Zaccharia does not offer the signficance of her "pragmatism" but it appears as if she already sees a secure and successfully sealed state of Israel in the future, with its settlements removed (how many?) and Sharon's successor's embracing the creation of a Palestinian state outside the security barrier. If everything goes to Sharon's plan - which is the best case scenario, with Likud likely to strengthen until March - then the de facto borders will not secure long-term peace. Furthermore, Israeli politics has seen the persistence of human agency in politics. After Rabin, the once hawkish general who vowed to "break the Palestinians' bones", saw the light of peace, Netanyahu still won the elections. Perhaps he will be the lucky rebounder after a tragic misshot once again.
Even critical International Herald Tribune columnist William Pfaff gives Sharon the doubtful benefit of Realism in TODAYonline:
"As prime minister, Mr Sharon combined realism with geopolitical fantasy. He acknowledged that Israel could not forever continue military and political domination of the occupied Palestinian territories, whose population would soon become more numerous than the population of Israel itself."It only requires a very watered-down form of Realism to accept the most striking political contingencies. Neoliberals do the same. And the vast majority of Israelis no longer lives under the illusion of acquiring the entire Palestinian territories. What may have really been a more accurate description of Sharon's style of politics may be, after all, a form of Zaccharia's pragmatism called opportunism. Sharon, despite initial appearances, gained great popularity from the pull-out. He acquired the air of another born-again politician, for which the Israeli public was yearning since Rabin's assassination. Sharon was then able to break the two-party system with ease, fashion Kadima in the way de Gaulle had moulded the Gaullist party. He was admired as the epitomy of the sabra: once the hard shell came apart, a soft rewarding core was exposed. After he had proven his manhood Israeli-style, he could relinquish it piecemeal.
Sharon was a realist and a pragmatist in the way he handled public opinion - and the way he bonded with Bush on ranches in the Negev and Texas. He kept his finger on the pulse of the Israeli mainstream and developed a sensibility to press in the right spots. But to me, the word opportunism springs to mind. No greater geopolitical corpus of principles or pattern of decision-making remains beyond this. In this vein, Olmert may well be able to carry on his legacy.

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